<?xml version="1.0" encoding="utf-8" standalone="yes"?><rss version="2.0" xmlns:atom="http://www.w3.org/2005/Atom"><channel><title>Jailbreaking on Software Engineering Group</title><link>https://seg.inf.unibe.ch/keywords/jailbreaking/</link><description>Recent content in Jailbreaking on Software Engineering Group</description><generator>Hugo</generator><language>en-US</language><copyright>Software Engineering Group (SEG), [Institute of Computer Science](https://www.inf.unibe.ch/), [University of Bern](https://www.unibe.ch/). All rights reserved.</copyright><atom:link href="https://seg.inf.unibe.ch/keywords/jailbreaking/index.xml" rel="self" type="application/rss+xml"/><item><title>Red-Teaming Foundational Model Enabled Robots</title><link>https://seg.inf.unibe.ch/teaching/student-projects/current/t0100-red-teaming-foundational-model-enabled-robots/</link><pubDate>Mon, 01 Jan 0001 00:00:00 +0000</pubDate><guid>https://seg.inf.unibe.ch/teaching/student-projects/current/t0100-red-teaming-foundational-model-enabled-robots/</guid><description>Large language models (LLMs) are increasingly used as high-level planners for robots: a natural-language mission is turned into a sequence of actions that a classical controller executes. Recent work has shown that such LLM-controlled robots can be jailbroken into performing physically harmful actions, often with 100% attack success, on commercial platforms [1]. Proposed defenses either wrap the planner in a guardrail [2] or restrict what the planner may emit. Planner–executor agents such as PEACE [3] take the second route: the LLM produces a single, fully typed plan over a fixed tool schema instead of free-form code or a step-by-step reasoning loop. Whether this architectural choice actually reduces the attack surface has never been measured. This project builds a reusable red-teaming harness for LLM-enabled robot planners in simulation and uses it to compare architectures under a common set of attacks.</description></item></channel></rss>